Critical Computation: Digital Automata and General Artificial Thinking by Parisi, Luciana
Parisi, Luciana. 2019. Critical Computation: Digital Automata and General Artificial Thinking.
Theory, Culture & Society, 36(2), pp. 89-121. ISSN 0263-2764 [Article]
http://research.gold.ac.uk/23966/
The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please
go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact
the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address:
gro@gold.ac.uk.
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For
more information, please contact the GRO team: gro@gold.ac.uk
For Peer Review
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical Computation: digital automata and general artificial 
thinking 
 
 
Journal: Theory Culture & Society 
Manuscript ID 15-308-HAYLES.R1 
Manuscript Type: TCS - Standard Article 
Key Words: 
cultural theory, digital, pragmatism, Hayles, automation, non-conscious 
cognition, machine learning, techno-power, abductive reasoning, 
computation, automation 
Abstract: 
As machines have become increasingly smart and have entangled human 
thinking to artificial intelligences, it seems no longer possible to distinguish 
amongst levels of decision-making that occur in the newly formed space 
between critical reasoning, logical inference, and sheer calculation. Since 
the 1980s, computational systems of information processing have evolved 
to include not only deductive methods of decision, whereby results are 
already implicated in their premises, but have crucially shifted towards an 
adaptive practice of learning from data, an inductive method of retrieving 
information from the environment and establish general premises. This 
shift in logical methods of decision-making does not simply concern 
technical apparatuses, but is a symptom of a transformation in logical 
thinking activated with and through machines. This article discusses the 
pioneering work of Katherine Hayles whose study of the cybernetic and 
computational infrastructures of our culture particularly clarifies this 
epistemological transformation of thinking in relation to machines. 
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decision-making that occur in the newly formed space between critical reasoning, 
logical inference, and sheer calculation. Since the 1980s, computational systems of 
information processing have evolved to include not only deductive methods of 
decision, whereby results are already implicated in their premises, but have crucially 
shifted towards an adaptive practice of learning from data, an inductive method of 
retrieving information from the environment and establish general premises. This shift 
in logical methods of decision-making does not simply concern technical apparatuses, 
but is a symptom of a transformation in logical thinking activated with and through 
machines. This article discusses the pioneering work of Katherine Hayles whose study 
of the cybernetic and computational infrastructures of our culture particularly clarifies 
this epistemological transformation of thinking in relation to machines. 
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At the core of computational systems today there is a latent paradox: capital’s 
investment in techno-intelligence has come to coincide with the explosion of non-
conscious or pre-cognitive decisions. From High Frequency Trading to Amazon 
purchases, from Uber platform to Cupid online dating, a crowd of learning algorithms 
efficiently drives decisions occurring below the reflective level of consciousness.1 
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However, whilst learning algorithms exponentially grow mountains of data, they also 
reduce complexity through statistical modeling, pattern recognition, data mining, 
knowledge discovery, predictive analytics, self-organising and adaptive systems. In 
particular, with the 1990s development of machine learning within branches of 
artificial intelligence, a new mode of algorithmic processing that learns from data 
without following explicit programming, has fundamentally transformed ideas of 
automation as a mere re-production of physical or mental functions. With machine 
learning, we are no longer discussing the automation of manual and mental work – 
generally corresponding to how physical and cognitive labour have become absorbed 
by the machine – but a qualitative extension of automation beyond its mere 
reproduction of instructions. What is at stake here is the automation of automation 
itself: machine learning is the manifestation of a new form of intelligence able to 
automate automation (Domingos, 2015: 9). Here, automation imparts a meta-level of 
functions, the generation of rules from the systemic correlation of data entering a new 
level of synthesis, including both deductive and inductive logic within the information 
calculus of probabilities.  
Whilst it is arguable that computation involves the interdependence between data, 
software, code, algorithms, hardware, the understanding of automation with machine 
learning rather points to a new configuration of logical reasoning: namely a shift from 
deductive truths applied to small data to the inductive retrieval and recombination of 
infinite data volumes. In particular, a focus on the transformation of the relation 
between algorithms and data contributes to explain the historical origination of non-
deductive reasoning, activated with and through machines. As Lorraine Daston points 
out, already during the Cold War, the conception of reason as based on truth, and on 
the faculty of judgment and discrimination, became historically re-conceptualised in 
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terms of patterns, and reason as “the rule” came to be understood in terms of ruling 
procedures with the task of calculating probability (Daston, 2010).  
This embedding reasoning into machines is entangled to the development of statistics 
and pattern recognition, which define how algorithms can learn and make predictions 
from recognizing data (from granular analysis to flexible and modular patterning of 
categories with textual, visual, phonic traits). As the system gathers and classifies 
data, learning algorithms match-make, select and reduce choices by automatically 
deciding the most plausible of data correlations. Machine learning involves a mode of 
cognition that no longer relies on the deductive model of logic, where proofs are 
already implicated in initial premises. Machine learning indeed is used in situations 
where rules cannot be pre-designed, but are, as it were, achieved by the computational 
behavior of data. Machine learning is thus the inverse of programming: the question is 
not to deduce the output from a given algorithm, but rather to find the algorithm that 
produces this output (Domingos, 7). Algorithms must then search for data to solve a 
query. The more data is available the more learning there can be. As statistics and 
probability theory enter the realm of artificial intelligence with learning algorithms in 
neural networks, new understandings of cognition, logical thinking and reasoning 
have come to the fore. From the Extended Mind Hypothesis to arguments about 
Machine Consciousness and the Global Brain, the question of what and how is 
cognition has come to coincide with the computational architecture of algorithms, 
data, software, hardware and with experiments in robotics sensing and self-awareness. 
But the implications of seemingly science fiction scenarios, in which either all forms 
of cognition will be absorbed into one integrated intelligent system (for instance 
Kwezeil’s singularity) or that there will be a plethora of intelligences (from ameaba to 
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robots), are far from being settled and shall be the concern of a critical computation 
theory able to account for the transformation of logical thinking in machines.  
With the historical synthesis of computational logic and probability calculus in 
automated systems, algorithms have become generative of other algorithms as they 
derive a rule to explain or predict data. The possibility of elaborating a rule from data 
rather than applying a given rule to outcomes also points to a form of cognition that 
cannot be defined in terms of problem solving solutions, but is understood as a 
general method of experimenting with problems. With machine learning, automation 
has involved with the creation of training activities that could generalize the function 
of prediction to future cases – a sort of inductive parable that from particulars aims to 
establish general rules. However, whether supervised, unsupervised and 
reinforcement learning2  refer not simply to a mindless training of functions, but 
instead can account for a form of inference proper to artificial intelligence shall 
concern discussion about the critical tension between reason and non-conscious and 
non-logical intelligence at the core of automated cognition.  
We know that the classical connection of reasoning to symbolic logic was a 
fundamental premise of Alan Turing’s famous thought experiment aiming to build a 
universal machine or abstract schema that performed reasoning through, as it were, 
the manipulation of symbols. Here, computational automation presupposes a series of 
symbols corresponding to truths hardwired to the brain and working universally as a 
deductive mode of reasoning. Today, the automation of logical reasoning rather 
involves that learning algorithms perform increasingly complex operations 
(evaluations, selections, decisions) on and through data, supported by tailored use of 
software and the flexibility of the hardware infrastructure. Despite the local 
applications of algorithmic procedures in design, logistics, music and economics, it is 
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evident today that the automation of automation particularly involves a new 
understanding of algorithms. Instead of simply being a central dogma in computation 
(based on symbolic deductive logic), learning algorithms, it is here suggested, point to 
a form of computational cognition that, whilst including the interdependent 
architecture of rules, software routine and subroutines, interfaces, hardware networks 
etc, shall be understood in terms of the new synthesis of non-deductive logic and 
dynamic calculation, overlapping logos with ratio. With this new synthesis, the 
automation of automation refers to algorithmic learning as an intelligible elaboration 
from functions of correlation, evaluation, selection, and past decision. Machine 
learning automata are therefore said to behave like cognitive systems that are 
evolutive, adaptive, and exhibit co-causal and emergent properties.3  
According to Katherine Hayles, as opposed to conscious thinking,4 these automated 
systems of cognition perform complex modeling and informational tasks at a fast 
speed because they are not required to go through the formal languages of 
mathematics and explicit equations.5 In other words, todays’ interactive, adaptive and 
learning algorithms are processing data without having to recur to the logical order of 
deduction that has characterised the Enlightenment theorisation of the function of 
reason.6 However, in agreement with Hayles, this article argues that the non-logical 
thinking of automated systems overlaps with the efficacy of cybernetic control 
whereby inductive learning becomes infused with the nonconscious cognition of 
algorithmic capital.  
In the attempt at qualifying further the distinction between consciousness, 
unconsciousness and awareness, between thinking (involving awareness) and 
cognition (that does not require consciousness, but can perform complex modeling 
and informational tasks), Hayles discusses the emergence of what she calls “cognitive 
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non-conscious” working at a “lower level of neural organization, not accessible to 
introspection” (4).  For Hayles, non-conscious cognition may operate independently 
from consciousness, but nonetheless it needs to be understood in systemic and not 
specific material processes because it involves an “intention toward” defined by its 
adaptive behavior and emergent capacities to process new data (4-5). In particular, 
Hayles distinguishes between conscious thinking, non-conscious cognition and 
material processes (5),7 and argues that technical systems today (from the use of 
genetic algorithms in compositional music to language learning devices such as 
Mitchell’s NELL or never ending language learning), constitute a built environment 
characterized by the exponential growth of nonconscious cognition devices. 
As the communication flow amongst automated systems increases, so does the effect 
of non-conscious intelligence on the distinction between automation and reasoning. 
At the core of non-conscious intelligence is the media system of data driven 
processing entangling together human and machine intelligence beyond both 
consciousness and symbolic deductive logic. However, this article suggests that whilst 
claims for non-conscious cognition challenge the meta-computational models based 
on symbolic and deductive logic, a philo-fiction of computation shall rather re-assess 
the critical understanding of algorithmic reasoning away from data-driven cognitive 
automation today.  
From this standpoint, Halyes’ s work offers a fictional re-assessment of cybernetics 
and computation as constituting automated systems of feedback control and logical 
procedures, which have become synthetic expressions of a cognitive activity, 
generalized from particularities (animal, humans, and machines).8  Her insights about 
the transformation of machines from thermodynamics to information and 
computational systems for instance already highlighted how the emergence of 
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responsive mechanisms and adaptive systems entailed a neoliberal form of 
governance no longer constituted by the law, the norm, and reason, but by control 
functions, behavioral operations based on procedures within self-regulating 
autopoietic agencies (i.e., reiterative loops, sequential tasks, flexible protocols, and 
flows of data). As procedural thinking comes to coincide with non-conscious 
intelligence, rule-obeying behaviors become substituted by the performativity of 
machinic functions (i.e., what x or y do and not and what they stand for) involving the 
indeterminacy of learning outcomes in an apparatus of data retrieval with no formal 
logic. This shift from rule-obeying truths to an algorithmic pragmatism using data to 
search and predict truths has also been understood as the end of rational choice 
(Mirowsky, 2002; Mackenzie, 2011). 
Hayles presents us with the cultural and social meaning of non-human intelligence (as 
defined by epistemological shift in theories of cognition) necessarily embedded in 
social practices and discourses (and are thus not to be simply addressed as a sort of 
teleological overcoming humanity) (2005). Using Wilfrid Sellars’ terminology 
(1963), however, it may be useful here to add that a critical engagement with this 
phase of automation of automation requires that the Scientific Image of intelligence is 
accounted for (e.g., the material physical, biological, computational description of 
intelligence), so that the Manifest Image of intelligence can be used to explain the 
conceptual framework embedded in machine intelligence as involving the socio-
cultural self-awareness of what automation is taken to be (and thus the extent to which 
the Manifest Image defines the capacity of machines to conceptually think and 
rationally act). According to Sellars, these double levels of material and conceptual 
activities are equally pregnant with meaning, and in order not to fall back into the 
myth of the given (the assumption of what thinking is), namely the essentialism of 
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cognition, or the empiricism of scientific descriptions and conceptual forms, the 
Scientific and Manifest Images are to be both worked through over and over again to 
explain the activities we are concerned with.9 From this standpoint, when speaking of 
algorithms, computation and artificial intelligence, it is important to unpack the 
meaning of the scientific and technical descriptions of their functions, which socially-
meditated and thus embedded in practices. In other words, whilst there is no direct 
translation between the scientific descriptions of function and the conceptual 
elaboration of their meaning, the scientific understanding of computational 
intelligence is nonetheless socially mediated, embedded and determined by the use of 
machines. Both the Scientific and the Manifest Image of computation therefore shall 
remain open to be re-mediated by new uses and scientific articulations.   
This article argues that algorithmic automation involves changes in the scientific 
image of computation and cognition, which is socially mediated by a fictive or 
speculative use of functions, involving not simply an idealized technoscience, but 
conceptual elaboration of how machines may think, exposing their own thinking 
capacities. To develop a critical view of computation thus requires an effort to unpack 
the historical and thus socially mediated relation between scientific and technological 
description of intelligence, and the changing conceptual manifestations of reasoning.. 
From this standpoint, whilst suspending current figurations of automated 
intelligence,10 the transformations of the scientific and manifest image that describe 
algorithmic performativity have already opened up the possibility of re-theorising the 
particularities of machine intelligence. With machine learning, algorithms indeed are 
no longer mere instructions, but are rather performative of instructions. Algorithms 
learn: they adapt, adjust and evolve their behavior according to the qualities and 
quantities of data. Their performative activity is afforded by their capacity to 
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compress large quantities of information and thus transform outputs into new inputs, 
and elaborating together two classically opposed forms of thinking: reason and 
calculation. Here data do not have to fit categories, but are re-definable in the manner 
in which algorithms generate possible rules, causes and facts where these are missing.  
However, to argue that the new phase of automation of automation could be discussed 
in terms of abductive reasoning is in contrast to the predominance of two models of 
artificial intelligence: namely, the logic of deduction, on the one hand, and inductive 
or informal logic, on the other. I suggest that these models do not simply concern the 
analysis of computational machines, but underpin contemporary ideas about cognition 
in animal, human and machine, as these seem to be divided between the 
ontologisation of computational cognition on the one hand (a meta-computational 
model of deduction) and an anti-formal view of cognition (or data-driven non-
conscious cognition). In particular, it has been argued that since the inductive model 
of cognition is “indifferent to the causes of phenomena, automation functions on a 
purely statistical observation of correlations between data captured in an absolutely 
non-selective manner in a variety of heterogeneous contexts” (Devroy, 2011: 126). 
According to Devroy, the inductive regime thus appeals to the immediate fact itself 
and implies the eradication of potentiality and/or indeterminacy, which she points out, 
diminishes the possibility of a critical approach to technology (127).  My attempt to 
re-theorise automated intelligence rather argues that computation starts with 
indeterminacies and yet this does not guarantee that automation could be liberated 
from the image of networked or cybernetic capital. However, its importance for 
critical computation shall be taken as the starting point to bring forward a philo-
fiction or speculative re-assessment of reason in the age of the algorithm. This may 
involve an investigation of forms hypothetical reasoning (or abductive logic) that may 
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or may not already be at work in automated system. Although abductive logic is 
mainly performed in automated models for medical diagnosis for instance, the 
possibility that automated systems can construct new forms of logical complexity, 
which could enable the theorisation of a general artificial intelligence other than that 
of the statistical regime of inductive capital, shall nonetheless be entertained. 
Learning algorithms are already a step towards this envisioning of abductive artificial 
intelligences, involving the conceptual re-elaboration of previous data correlations, 
rules, and functions that can be used to construct new hypothesis. A critical theory of 
computation will therefore imply that there is not only an overlapping, but also an 
emerging synthesis of functions and concepts across data systems, including the 
algorithmic abstraction of social meanings through data retrieval. This would involve 
an automated meta-abductive reasoning, whereby learning algorithms elaborate a 
meta-hypothetical function from where they infer missing rules, facts and unknown 
causes (Inoue et al., 2013, 240). As discussed later, the introduction of abductive logic 
in automation can be distinguished from the data-driven model of induction and the 
non-conscious forms of cognition embedded in computational devices. Here rules and 
truths are not simply skipped by re- hypothesized, re-assessed and invented.  
Hayles’ fictive investigation about how machines think indeed offers us important 
understandings of the deductive and inductive modes of cognition embedded in 
intelligent systems.  
1. Computation is not cognition  
In My Mother was a Computer, Hayles discusses the view of computation as a 
universal model of cognition and intelligence (2005). Hayles refers to the 
development in AI in the 70s, to John Koza’s use of genetic algorithms to design 
band-pass filters, and circuits that no longer require the creativity and intuition of 
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highly skilled electrical engineers. Similarly, she describes intelligent machines that 
can perform mind-like activities, such as Rodney Brooks’ Cog project, the 
information–filtering ecology developed by Alexander Moukas and Pattie Maes, and 
neural nets of many different kinds. Hayles also anticipates that in the near future the 
question of mind-like machines will become irrelevant as machines continue to 
develop their own thinking functions. As movies such as Spike Jones’ Her (2014), 
and more recently Ex-Machina (2015) reveal, it has become discursively accepted that 
machines have cognitive functions and that their intelligible capacities of discerning 
data and elaborating patterns have stepped to an other level of autonomy from mind-
like thinking (and thus have not much to do with what a human mind can do). A 
warning against the fast evolution of AI is also echoed by Stephen Hawkings’ recent 
claim that “[t]he development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the 
human race. It would take off on its own, and re-design itself at an ever-increasing 
rate" (2014).  
Despite this alarming call to arms against the super intelligence of artificial systems, 
the question of what machines think, and whether this thinking coincides with what it 
is meant by reasoning, remains open and in need of more discussion. As Hayles 
already pointed out, there are at least two main positions that reveal the tension 
between automation and reasoning (2005). Here, the relation between the Scientific 
and the Manifest Image is grounded either in the formal theory of universal 
computation, or the non-deductive reasoning of non-conscious computation. On the 
one hand, the so-called field of digital philosophy claims that the world of appearance 
can be explained in terms of a universal ground of computation, according to which 
algorithmic discrete units can explain all complexity of the physical world and can 
imitate reasoning (e.g., the strong AI hypothesis). On the other hand, the claims of 
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and for non-conscious computation (i.e., non-symbolic AI) have extended the 
scientific image of computation to include intelligent functions that are experiential 
rather than formal.  
My point, however, is that both positions tend to explain the manifest image of 
thought through and by means of the scientific image of what is cognition. In 
particular, the digital explanation of cognition remains attached to a deductive method 
of reasoning, in which the scientific truth about the mind and intelligence is 
prescriptive of what these can achieve. Here the general determines the particular. 
This position establishes equivalence between natural and artificial intelligence based 
on a deductive method of reasoning by which to cognize corresponds to, as in the 
strong AI hypothesis, the syntactical manipulation of symbols. On the other hand, the 
extension of the scientific image to include somatic explanations of cognition (as in 
for example the research into affective computing and emotional intelligence) 11 
instead relies on local low levels of neural organisations, which work together to 
achieve an overall effect that is bigger than their parts. This position embraces an 
inductive method of reasoning in which general claims about intelligence are derived 
from the observation of recurring phenomenal patterns. This scientific explanation of 
intelligence reveals the centrality of a non-conscious level of cognition already at 
work in current forms of computational intelligent devices. Despite lacking 
consciousness or autonomy, computational devices indeed are said to share non-
conscious cognition with human intelligence and if anything, given that human 
intelligence is bounded to conscious cognition, smart devices are much faster than us 
at making connections (Hayles, 2014). 
When discussing reason in the age of the algorithm, we are thus faced with two main 
claims subtended by two methods of logical reasoning, defining intelligence and its 
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manifestations. I argue that both claims are limited by an assumed equivalence 
between computation and symbolic cognition on the one hand, and computation and 
non-conscious local cognition, on the other. In both cases, the scientific image is used 
to ground the manifest image without accounting for the complex dimensions of 
meaning that both produce. If the diatribe between deductive and inductive models of 
the scientific image of automated reasoning relies only on the scientific description of 
cognition (as either rooted in symbolic language or in affective non-conscious 
immediacy), it risks missing an important point: namely the concreteness of 
conceptual frameworks (i.e., the embedding of reasoning in the social) subtending the 
manifest image of cognition (i.e., what and how logical reasoning manifests itself) 
and their transformations in the context of automated learning. 
Arguing for a critical computation is instead my attempt to clarify the role of the 
manifest image of reason in the phase of automation of automation in both 
pragmaticist and transcendental terms. In particular, from pragmaticism, I take the 
important proposition that reason is not a formal apriori, but corresponds to the 
conceptual infrastructure of social practices. This means that the logical operations of 
reason and its rule-bounded functions depend upon or are established by a collective 
use-meaning of data. The use-meaning of data refers not simply to a mere functional 
use, but to the dynamic re-assessment of the social meaning (and not the truth) 
embedded in the computational abstraction of the social use of data. In this phase of 
automation, I suggest that the use-meaning of data implies a collective formation of 
abductive inferences within and throughout computational logic, based on the 
hypothetical elaboration of the meaning included within non-discursive and local use 
of data – on behalf of algorithms, software, subroutines, codes, as well as databases, 
platforms, interfaces etc.  
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To view automation as the synthesis of statistical learning and abductive logic may 
help us to envision the hypothetical reasoning of machines as these involve not data-
matching but inferential relations across the informational fields of large-scale data 
and randomness. In this context, a transcendental understanding of reasoning may 
entail the capacity of machine learning to eventually generate concepts and carry out 
general rules unbounded from the bias of specific localities. Instead of being the result 
of an individual mind or eternal intelligence, this transcendental elaboration from and 
of data is also a manifestation of the algorithmic use-meaning of data, incorporating 
social practices within artificial intelligences, of which algorithmic abduction is only 
one instance. 
Before explaining my proposition further, I want to discuss the computational model 
of deductive reasoning and how its crisis has been symptomatic of the re-organization 
of technocapitalism (i.e., the economic investment in automated networks) involving 
the view that automated intelligence corresponds to affective or non-conscious 
cognition.  
2. Digital Philosophy  
The computational model of deductive reasoning is central to digital philosophy. Here 
the manifest image of thought conforms to the scientific idea that the brain is 
equipped with an innate system of symbols, neurologically connected and 
syntactically processed.12 Digital philosophy particularly refers to the computational 
paradigm used to describe physical and biological phenomena in nature and to offer a 
computational description of the mind. This approach problematically sees 
computation as the merging of being and thought. It gives an algorithmic explanation 
to both biophysical reality and the thinking of reality (Wolfram, 2002). Central to this 
paradigm is also the view that algorithms are digital automata, evolving over time (i.e. 
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cellular automata). These automata compress, render or simulate the various levels of 
physical, biological, cultural randomness, deriving semantic meaning from already 
determined rules, whose functions are syntactically arranged and where results can be 
automatically deduced.  
According to Hayles, however, digital philosohy contains no apriori truths in itself 
and its claims are rather the result of intermediations about physical reality, cultural 
attitudes, technological developments, which coevolve in contestation, competition 
and cooperation of discourses (2005). From this standpoint, in order to explain how 
one manifest image of computation becomes dominant over another, one has to 
establish the historical transformations in the understanding of rule-bounded 
behaviour of automata, without simply appealing to computational ontology.  
For instance, Hayles highlights the influence of 2nd order cybernetics’ notion of 
reflexivity on the computational paradigm, which led to the realization that 
computation could not just illustrate logical infrastructures, but rather required an 
engagement with materiality (2005). This influence of 2nd order cybernetics, however, 
is accompanied by a crisis of reason (of a normative model of pre-set rules) that 
characterizes the structure of governance of the neoliberal form of technocapitalism. 
Far from demarcating the end of normative reason, this crisis has to be seen as a 
threshold of change within a vaster mechanism of regulation, functions and rules 
transforming the normative regime based on laws into a computational infrastructure 
of procedures.  
With 2nd order cybernetics, the reflexive loop between mind and matter shows how 
logical reasoning rather worked backwardly, converting contingent phenomena into 
necessary laws, including errors, malfunctions and breakdowns re-inserted within a 
computational model of optimization and within capital’s governance of 
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indeterminacies. The crisis of the logical method of deduction thus importantly 
marked the beginning of a predictive statistical regime for which, as Hayles explains 
(2014), non-conscious or affective thinking have become the motor of automated 
cognition. Here not truths, but contingent phenomena or unknowns have acquired an 
ontological superiority able to transcend the epistemological certitude of scientific 
knowledge.  
As intelligent machines have become embodied and material agents interact amongst 
themselves and make decision without being supervised, automated cognition has left 
behind deductive forms of consequential reasoning. For instance, distributed cognitive 
environments expose this new level of indeterminacy-driven automation on the one 
hand, and of inductive forms of decision-making, on the other. Here deductive logic 
has been replaced by the match-making correlation of data connecting local recurrent 
phenomena with the indeterminacy of external factors. Central to this new form of 
automation is Hayles’ view of non-conscious cognition. 
4. Nonconscious computation 
According to Hayles, communication technologies, ambient systems, embedded 
devices, and other technological affordances have acquired a cognitive function, 
which operates below the threshold of awareness, and without the structure of 
symbolic reference. For the classical view of computation (or strong AI hypothesis) 
cognition coincided with self-awareness. The role of intelligence was assumed to 
involve the function of tracking effects from pre-established causes and contain 
outputs/results into programmed inputs. We know that this classical view of AI failed.  
In the book Perceptrons, Marvin Lee Minsky claimed that a single neuron could only 
compute a small number of logical predicates in any given case, and, his experiments 
casted a long shadow on neural network research in the 70s. In the late1980s and 
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1990s, after the so-called “AI winter”, new models of AI research addressed sub-
symbolic manifestations of intelligence and adopted non-deductive and heuristic 
methods to be able to deal with uncertain or incomplete information. Boxing away 
symbolic logic, there emerged algorithmic-networked procedures able to solve 
problems by means of trial and error by interacting directly with data. These were 
learning bots retrieving information through reiterative feedbacks, so as to map and 
navigate computational space by constructing neural connections amongst nodes. 
Central to these models is the idea that intelligence is not a top-down program to 
execute, but that automated systems need to develop intelligent skills characterized by 
speedy, non-conscious, non-hierarchical orders of decision based on an iterative re-
processing of data, heuristically selected by means of trial and error. The development 
of statistical approaches was particularly central to this shift towards non-deductive 
logic, or the activation of an ampliative or non-monotonic inferential logic. As 
recently re-popularised in the aesthetically powerful movie Ex-machina (2015), the 
famous Turing Test maintains that not only rational, but also emotional awareness is 
fundamental to cognitive performance and the evolution of artificial intelligence from 
simply being a mechanic accomplishment of tasks. As Hayles points out, the 
advancing of non-conscious cognition in intelligent machines precisely exposes new 
horizons to our understanding of cognition and meaning (2014). Non-conscious forms 
of automated cognition can solve complex problems without using formal languages 
or inferential deductive reasoning, and without the need of consciousness. By using 
low levels neural organisation and iterative and recursive patterns of preservation, this 
inductive method of reasoning implies the emergence of a total behaviour or an 
intelligent effect than is bigger than the parts constituting it. From this standpoint, as 
Hayles observers, emergence, complexity and adaptation and the phenomenal 
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experience of cognition cannot be reduced to material processes (2014). Instead, the 
tension between automation and thinking is reconceived by Hayles in terms of a 
tripartite system of distinct degrees of thought, which involves conscious thinking, 
non-conscious cognition, and material processes. Non-conscious cognition involves 
collective and not individual or specific materiality of intelligence and whilst humans 
share levels of consciousness with other animals, it is remarkable, Hayles points out, 
that non-conscious cognition operates across humans, animals and technical devices 
(2014). In particular, the low level activities of non-conscious cognition – described 
for instance in the example of the missing half second 13  and imperceptible and 
affective speed - show that, at these levels, cognition is not coherent and does not 
require the labour of editing information to match given conceptual frameworks. For 
Hayles, what is promising of cognitive non-conscious technical devices is that they 
can operate at temporal regimes inaccessible to human consciousness and exploit the 
missing half-second at their advantage (2014). This also implies a machine-like 
cognition of temporalities pointing out that automated systems are able to tap in the 
smallest units of time that are registered or recorded not only through a digital clock 
(and its binary language), but also through an immediate correlation of states. In short, 
non-conscious cognitive processes defy the centrality of human consciousness and the 
anthropocentric view of intelligence. From this standpoint, following Hayles, one has 
to make a distinction between non-conscious affective states of perception and the 
very material forms of sensori-motor perception. In other words, and in accordance 
with Sellar’s distinction between the Scientific and the Manifest Image, cognition is 
here not to be taken as a direct image of material processes (2014). Hayles indeed 
espouses the idea that the anti-deductive operations of non-conscious cognition are 
somatically marked, but are also phenomenologically embodied. Here, there is no 
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direct correspondence, but instead an elaboration of the material, already involving 
mediation between the bio-physical and neural states with perceptive and cognitive 
receptions. Since cognition is grounded in the body, entwined with the recall and 
reenactment of bodily states and actions, perceptual and cognitive states start from a 
non-conscious intelligence, which becomes superseded by  - or supplied by - mental 
simulations in higher-level thinking  (and for Hayles, in conscious state). This shows 
that biological systems have evolved mechanisms that are able to re-represent 
perceptual and bodily states, rather than making these states directly accessible to 
consciousness. According to Hayles, technical systems or instruments have non-
conscious cognition. However, whilst the hammer and a financial algorithm are 
designed with an intention in mind, only the trading algorithm demonstrates non-
conscious cognition insofar as its intentionality is embodied within the physical 
structures of the network of data on which it runs, and which sustain its capacity to 
make quick decisions (2014).  
This shift from formal cognition based on deductive inference to a model of 
nonconscious cognition embodied in the networked intelligence of local systems has 
led to a larger communication flow among automated devices and not exclusively 
between humans and machines. As this bot to bot phase of computation takes over, 
the increasing population of consciousness-lacking intelligent devices, it is feared, 
will overtake the consciousness-bounded and hierarchical structure of human 
intelligence. This radical transformation of the scientific image of thought compared 
to how automated intelligence is manifested, points out that thought is independent 
from law-binding logic and that rather, it relies upon non-conscious functions 
entrenched to the weights of data in networks.  
Whilst it is impossible not to admit that non-conscious levels of cognition are 
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radically transforming not only the scientific but also the manifest image of automated 
intelligence, there are questions that seem rather difficult to address. If, for instance, 
high frequency trading algorithms are to be considered as non-conscious cognitive 
functions, effectively changing socio-economic behavior, are we also accepting the 
scientific view of an extended non-conscious mind? What is the significance of this 
new form of equivalence between non-conscious thinking and automated intelligence, 
defined by a bodily-oriented view of computation? What are the limits of an 
inductive, non-inferential data-driven form of immediate communication for helping 
us to explain what and how is the manifest image of automated logical reasoning 
beyond the totalizing image of techno-power?  
5. Techno-power 
To answer these questions, one could suggest that the scientific image of non-
conscious automated cognition is enmeshed with an ontological primacy of 
contingency, in which intelligence coincides with an environment of indeterminate 
data, which automated cognition aims to compress in simpler chunks. From this 
standpoint, the primacy of contingency has become constitutive of a more general 
shift in the mechanization of reasoning, initiated with neoliberal technocapital.  
This shift is characterised by a re-orientation of the practices of real subsumption, in 
which capital’s investment in the general intellect has led human-machines networked 
intelligences to become a motor of cognitive and affective labour, and, as some argue, 
of the capitalisation of the relational qualities of life (Massumi, 2015) attached to the 
regime of indebtedness (Lazzarato, 2012). 14  The manual phase of automation of 
industrial capitalism imparted an ontological separation between human labour and 
the accumulation of labour value incorporated in machines. Despite the financial 
valorization of humans in terms of variable labour or force, machines’s task was to 
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preserve and augment the value of reproductive labour. It was through machines that 
the rational principles of task-oriented efficiency of the assembly line could be 
realised following the monotonic logic of formal language, in which results had to 
coincide with the set premises carried out and executed with machines. This deductive 
form of automation has of course not simply disappeared, but has become infused 
with a context-oriented form of reproduction. Here the human-machine network has 
acquired a form of autonomy from the specific use value of human and machine 
labour. With real subsumption, capital is no longer and mainly concerned with 
avoiding contingency and human errors. Instead, this networked form of abstraction 
(of relational value) is now carried out through the intelligent synthesis of 
computational logic (deductive, inductive and abductive) and statistical calculus 
(experimental compression of randomness). Here machine learning languages use the 
data environment to select, evaluate, rank, match and re-configure information 
according to the social use of data. This form of automation has reached a non-
prescribed form of valorisation insofar as algorithms experiment with data by 
learning, adapting, and assessing the value of large amounts of information. Whilst 
this intelligent valorisation of any use of data involves no consciousness, it is 
nonetheless a form of cognition embedded in affective levels of perception, 
entrenched within the particular physical structures of the network through which 
algorithms make quick decisions. 
In AntiOedipus (1983), Deleuze and Guattari had already individuated this 
transformative tendency of the human-machine network of abstraction and had 
warned us against what they called “immanent axiomatics” (1983, 246). The 
rationalisation of labour by means of machines no longer operates deductively, 
according to a pre-established rule, but has come to embrace experiential values, 
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enveloped in the complexity of the social, through which an axiomatic regime could 
be directly engendered (233). Not only calculative machines had entered the realm of 
the real, but also a new synthesis of automation and reasoning had come to invest the 
sociality of thinking (although perhaps the non-conscious level of thinking first) and 
its contingent variabilities, because of which capital had to declare the fallacy of 
deduction.  
In our post-cybernetic culture, capital’s axiomiatics – and its rule-bounded activities – 
is subsumed to the volatile contingencies of the markets and the statistical destruction 
of logos. Here the politics of liberation from universal laws and the ultimate crisis of 
reason in favour of non-conscious intelligence have become paradoxically equivalent.    
Following Brian Massumi’s analysis of the contemporary reconfiguration of neo-
liberal governance, one could argue that the end of rational economy has been 
accompanied by the crisis of the rational implementation of machines (2009; 2015; 
Mirowski, 2002). The computational infrastructure of social media for instance, as the 
privileged form of marketing, branding, economic operations, political campaigns, 
institutional governance, security screening, etc., no longer abides to pre-established 
modalities of profit making and control. Instead, the synthesis of logic and calculus in 
automation has transformed the communication qualities of the human-machine 
network into learning, interactive, distributive architectures of non-conscious 
cognition. Paradoxically, therefore this so-called cognitive phase of capitalism has 
given way to the abstraction of human-machine levels of affective thinking. This form 
of technocapitalism has invested in human intelligence and creativity, driving humans 
to become self-entrepreneurs or governor of their extended self.  
In the movie Her (2014), the Artificial Intelligence Samantha acts in a world in which 
not only affectivity is fully programmed and programmable, but also the human-
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machine networked capital has been replaced by automated automation, where the 
non-conscious intelligence of the Operating System is no longer wrapped around the 
hierarchies of deductive reasoning. Samantha does not only carry out tasks at 
imperceptible speed, but is also equipped with the empathic quality of prediction, 
tuning into the viscerality of cognitive functions to anticipate responses before they 
are manifested. As the AI of operating systems acquires affective intelligence, the 
human-machine network of neoliberal capital has become a distant memory compared 
to this form of Skynet AI,15  as the automation of automation gathers self-aware 
intelligences, and leaves humans behind, resigned to think and feel anything anew.  
However, whilst the imaginary of Skynet AI implies the emergence of a self-aware 
general intelligence, the shift from deductive to inductive automation could be 
understood in terms of what Massumi defines as “ecological rationality” acting 
through the affective intelligence of the body, turning symbolic values into life styles, 
and rules into experiential qualities (2015). At the core of this ecological rationality is 
a non-conscious distributive embodied intelligence, in which all is locally induced to 
generate the global effects of unification of one body without organs. These inductive 
(or effect-driven) operations of networked capital epitomises the non-inferential 
reasoning of embodied intelligence, making decision without formal calculation. This 
form of anti-logos demarcates the technocapitalist deterritorialisation of rationality, 
which resolves the tension between automation and thinking through the convergence 
of consciousness and affect. Far from being liberating, the deposition of inferential 
reasoning is constantly advertised to us as the ability of networked capital to package 
social complexity in profiles available to us at the touch of a button.  
Within this context, the real challenge today is perhaps not to map the human-
machine-animal non-conscious cognition, but to critically re-address the function of 
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reason and to theorise – rather then reject – the automated use of inferential reasoning 
as part of a general artificial thinking. My efforts here concern not only an anti-
essentialist theorisation of thinking, for which reasoning can be understood as an 
elaboration of material, non-conscious and conscious cognition, but also involve an 
understanding of the cognitive possibilities for a critical theory of computation.  
In what follows, I suggest that to engage critically with the question of inferential 
reasoning in automated cognition, we need to first discuss the problem of the limit of 
computation in the context of information theory. We need to envision a form of 
artificial reasoning that goes beyond both the focus on locally-induced cognition, and 
the meta-computational reduction of the material world to the symbolic language of 
AI. In particular, to shift the argument for a general artificial thinking away from 
these two main views of computation, one has to first address some key issues within 
computation itself that may start with the question of the limit of the Turing Machine. 
Critical computation may perhaps concern how unpredictability or randomness in 
information theory has been addressed not as a sign of logical failure, but as an 
evolution of an artificial thinking with and through the computational synthesis of 
calculus and logic.  
During the 1980s, information theorist Gregory Chaitin extended the question of the 
limit of computational logic to include an entropic conception of information or 
randomness (i.e., the implication that the tendency of information is to increase in size 
over time) (Chaitin, 2005; 2006). For Chaitin, computation corresponds to the 
algorithmic compressing of maximally unknowable probabilities or incomputables. 
Since Alan Turing’s invention of the Universal Turing Machine, incomputables have 
demarcated the limits of computation or formal reasoning (i.e., the deductive logic of 
axioms or truths). According to Chaitin, however, incomputable are only partially 
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indeterminable insofar as within the computational processing of infinite information, 
the synthesis of logic and calculus has given way to a new form of axiomatic, 
experimental axiomatics (2005; 2006).16 The computational processing of information 
involves the way algorithms compress information to a final probable state (i.e., 0s or 
1s) and eventually mix and match data. However, computational compression rather 
demonstrates that outputs are always bigger than inputs (Calude and Chaitin, 1999), 
shaking the assumption that automated thinking is grounded in simple rules and that 
cognitive reasoning corresponds to the manipulation of symbols hardwired to the 
brain. Following Chaitin, it is possible to suggest that randomness in computation or 
that which constitutes the very limit of computational deduction, demarcates the point 
at which automated cognition coincides not with non-conscious functions involves an 
algorithmic intelligible capacity to extract more information from data substrates. 
Chaitin claims that computational processing leads to postulates that cannot be 
predicted in advance by the program and are therefore experimental insofar as results 
exceed their premise, and outputs outrun inputs (2006). 
Despite Chaitin’s insistence that incomputables expose indeterminacy in formal 
reasoning, it is possible to suggest that non-deductive logic coincides with an 
experimental axiomatics in the computational determination of unknowns.  
Algorithmic compression thus implies the formation of intelligible activities 
transforming data correlations into experimental truths precisely through an 
experimental method of compression. To put it in another way, with algorithmic 
information theory, axioms results from an algorithmic intelligibility of data 
environments, involving a speculative function through which unknowns are 
algorithmically prehended.17  
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From this standpoint, the techno-capitalist investment in artificial thinking coincides 
not simply with the proliferation of a non-logical apparatus of affective cognition. 
Techno-capital seems instead forced to confront the computational configuration of 
non-sensuous or proto-conceptual patterns and functions able to abstract, revise and 
diverge from pre-established rules. The computational elaboration of data concerns 
not only functions of selection and correlation, but more importantly involve an 
experimental determination, whereby the decisional activities of axioms remain 
flexible and yet conclusive. In other words, whilst data seem to be mindlessly 
aggregated by non-conscious functions, with experimental axiomatics, one shall 
account for a new form of logic carried out from within computational processing: the 
intelligible activities of algorithmic functions can no longer be delimited to perform 
pre-established rules.   
From this standpoint, one has to view techno-capital not only as the reduction of 
reasoning to the function of mindless or non-conscious activities of machines, but also 
as involved into a deeper transformation of automated intelligence, the elaboration 
and generation of data into intelligible patterns, an alien or denaturalising alliance 
between intelligence and conceptuality intrinsic to the automation of thinking.  
Parallel and distributed orders of computational language point to a new form of 
informational stratification of contingencies, precisely involving this algorithmic 
elaboration of data. This can be understood as an artificial mode of intelligibility, 
exposing the computational structuring of sociality. From this standpoint, a critical 
approach to computation requires us to look closely at the historical transformation of 
the mechanization of thinking, involving not simply an abstraction of neural functions 
of the brain, but of the social practices of thinking and acting. Whilst capital’s 
investment in the automation of cognition has led to the synthesis of logic and 
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calculation, computational processing has rather exposed the limits of deduction and 
statistics and the central role of randomness (or infinities, or contingencies, or non-
inferential materialities) within this synthesis.  
If algorithmic information theory concerns the Scientific Image of computational 
logic and statistical calculation, it also reveals a crucial transformation of the Manifest 
Image of a dominant understanding of computation based on the inductive, data-
centred operations of technocapital and its non-logical governance. A critical 
approach to this dominant understanding thus requires that the Scientific Image of 
computation shall be accounted for in its historical changes, which involves re-
assessing what we take the relation between algorithms, data, software, code and 
hardware infrastructure of contemporary culture to be. However, a critical effort to 
account for algorithmic intelligibility in its historical and experimental transformation 
also implies that its Manifest Image becomes a space for a philo-fiction, or 
speculative conceptualisation of automated reasoning within a view of a general 
artificial intelligence. This space shall aim not only to defy the exceptionalism of 
human consciousness, but also to re-invent what consciousness and reason can 
become in this configuration of automated thinking. The next section will explore this 
point further.    
6. Abduction 
A dynamic re-articulation of the Scientific and Manifest Image of computation can 
help us to re-open the ontological tension between thinking and automation. As 
argued so far, algorithmic automation does not simply involve a replacement of 
reason with non-conscious technologies of decision. Instead, the realisation of the 
limits of deductive reasoning in computation involves a multiplication of 
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experimental axiomatics as algorithms become performative of intelligible activities 
across nested informational architectures.  
This is no longer a question of bypassing the predictive functions of cognition through 
an optimised non-rule bounded transmission of data. Instead, one has to envisage a re-
structuring of logical reasoning that can account for this new phase in the history of 
automated intelligence, involving a conceptual elaboration of non-conscious 
prehensions and of the material dimensions of data. This elaboration, as suggested 
earlier, involves a synthesis of logic and calculation, and, in the case of algorithmic 
intelligence, of non-deductive reasoning and dynamic statistics (i.e. the inclusion of 
randomness in calculation).  
Critical computation therefore shall first of all address the speculative function of 
reason18 insofar as the limits of mechanised deductive logic have become a point of 
departure for an experimental determination of truths. It may be helpful here to revisit 
this tension between critical and speculative functions of reasoning by re-theorising 
the post-Turing scenario of experimental axiomatics through a pragmatist approach to 
logic and inferential reasoning. In particular, the pragmatist effort to explain logic in 
terms of a continuity of process between material practices, discursive articulations 
and axiomatic truths shall be understood as a speculative configuration of methods 
involving deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning.  
One important instance of this configuration can already be found in Charles Sander 
Peirce’s triadic system of logic, which admits that thinking entails an abductive-
inductive-deductive circuit of inference (1998, 273; 1995). This system importantly 
challenges both the representational and the empirical schema of AI and can offer an 
insight about a possible envisioning of a general artificial intelligence. In particular, 
Peirce’s triadic method always starts from a hypothetical or speculative explanation of 
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events. This involves the predictive envisioning of unknowns through general 
observables (induction), and thus the temporary establishment of a series of truths 
(deduction), which can be tested through experimental methods of trial and error 
(induction), from which new rules could be established (deduction).  In other words, 
induction is a method of generalisation of objects and events, which presupposes a 
conceptual framework that locates objects and events in space and time. To some 
extent, therefore, induction presupposes knowable objects and also fixed concepts that 
can be learned – involving the matching between a pre-existing concept and a 
heuristic process of trial and error to match it for instance. In particular, for Peirce, 
induction corresponds to a process of evaluation, which may produce very simple new 
ideas, but not sufficiently new to engender a new of hypothesis (Magnani, 2009: 289). 
Whilst deduction produces no new ideas, because inferential reasoning refers to a 
logical implication for which outcomes are contained within given premises, 
induction involves the evaluation of hypotheses and thus an ampliative process of 
generalisation too.  
According to Peirce, instead, abduction mainly concerns a process of creating new 
“explanatory” hypothesis. Abduction is a process of inferring facts, laws, hypothesis 
that can speculatively explain some unknown phenomena. In other words, it concerns 
reasoning as involving not only the evaluation, but also the formation of new 
explanatory hypothesis  (Magnani, 8). With abduction, it is possible to draw semiotic 
chains from non-inferential social practices and extrapolate the meaning embedded in 
these practices through an experimental production of truths. Here, general concepts 
or truths depend upon, but are not limited to, the material practices and the discursive 
statements that subtend them (Magnani, 65-70). 
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Rules are thus not fixed and are not symbolic representation of material practices. 
Instead, within pragmatism, rules are the result of hypothetical and inductive 
evaluation of not known events. In other words, pragmatism shows us that logic is 
embedded in a social matrix through which rules are constructed by means of 
hypothetical assertions, defining a process of abstraction by which local specificities 
are structured in a general schema of relations of relations. From this standpoint, 
Peirce’s abductive logic may be useful to account for the Manifest Image of the 
automation of automated intelligence, because it involves a reconfiguration of the 
conceptual infrastructure bringing both the methods of deduction and induction into a 
larger space of reasoning that includes hypothetical inference. Here the inductive 
testing of hypothesis – or the generalisation of new simple ideas – is not a proof of 
truths carried out by efficient procedures, as local particularities exemplify the 
generality of truths. Instead, Peirce’s triadic logic admits that inductive testing is 
superseded by a new hypothesis that enlarges the horizons of premises beyond 
probable results, or proofs to find postulates. In other words, abductive reasoning, as 
opposed to the inductive testing of already known ideas, helps us to explain and not 
discount the causal process that conditions and constrains the generation of new 
hypothesis. This involves a dialectic overlapping of induction and deduction, the 
validity of both testing and truth within the speculative articulations of hypothesis.    
Since automation is becoming transcendental from its functions of logical 
implications (deduction) and generalisation of known concepts and objects 
(induction), Pierce’s argument for abductive reasoning is useful because it challenges 
both the metacomputational model of digital philosophy and the data-oriented 
dominance of current technocapitalism. From this standpoint, with abduction one can 
suggest that automated intelligible functions – the synthetic elaboration of data on 
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behalf of learning algorithms - only serve to grant the consequent function of reason 
that, to say it with Alfred N. Whitehead, arrives to establish the permanence of rules 
through an abstraction, or a speculative formalisation of what occurs as a consequence 
of the relation between particulars (1967, 24-25).  
The pragmatist method of abduction claims not only for the existence of intelligible 
patterning, but also for a conceptual elaboration of what is implicit within them, 
within non-conscious cognition and material substrates. Rules are determined by 
social practices and logic is at the end point of intelligible activities or elaborations. 
Pragmatics thus comes before logic, because the latter is the point at which social 
meaning becomes synthesised into formal rules. This non-representational approach 
to inferential reasoning can help us to address automation in terms of speculative 
inference. 
Both the deductive model of axiomatic truths (and symbolic reasoning) and the 
inductive procedures of data-retrieval (and match-making non-inferential 
transmission), obfuscate the radical potential of Hayles’s fictive theorisation about 
what human cognition is and can become. With speculative pragmatism instead one 
can suspend the assumption that capital is the agent of automation through which 
rational and irrational modes of profit, governance and control are implemented. For 
critical computation, the material, affective and cognitive evolution of automated 
systems exposes the speculative dimension of reasoning embedded in the social and 
collective use-meaning of information. If the automation of automation demarcates a 
new threshold of transformation of AI, it is because it is involved in the 
transformation of the general structuring of reasoning itself, including the triadic 
configuration of abductive, inductive and abductive inferencing. If the manner in 
which thought think itself thinking has always been mediated by the environment – 
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and is thus ampliative and not representational - the formation of new hypothesis from 
the increasing availability of data also defines the proliferation of non-human 
intelligences. And yet, for automated reasoning to generate new hypothesis, it is 
crucial that error, fallibility and indeterminacy are evaluated inductively so that they 
become part of learning. Learning indeed here acquires a new meaning. It concerns 
not the apprehension of notions, tasks, and functions. Instead, it requires thinking 
through errors, blind spots, unknowns. Here, the possible fallibility of reasoning is 
central to the possibilities of learning through hypothetical scenarios, pushing the 
limits of automated cognition beyond data recombination or the mere executions of 
rules.     
As Lorenzo Magnani argues, since the 80s abductive reasoning has been adopted by 
diagnostic and expert systems (2009), and in general by a computational infrastructure 
of reasoning, based on the use of inferential synthesis or inference to the best 
explanation (68). Importantly, Magnani distinguishes between model-based 
abduction– a theory based inference - and manipulative abduction – defined by 
action-oriented or extra-theoretical reasoning (7; 9-12).19  
Theoretical or model-based abduction corresponds to the exploitation of internalised 
models, diagrams or pictures and illustrates, according to Magnani, much of what is 
important in creative abductive reasoning, in humans and in computational programs 
(23-24; 34; 36), involving the objective of selecting and creating a set of hypotheses 
(diagnoses, causes, prognosis). Theoretical abduction, according to Magnani, however 
fails to account for those cases in which there is a kind of “discovering through 
doing” (42); cases in which new and still unexpressed information is codified by 
means of manipulations of some external objects. Manipulative abduction instead 
happens with thinking through doing. It refers to extra-theoretical behavior that 
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creates communicable accounts of new experiences and integrates them into existing 
systems of experimental and linguistic practices (Magnani, 46).20 
In models of artificial intelligence, for instance, abductive reasoning has been used for 
diagnosis, planning, natural languages processing, probability theory, formal 
programming (Magnani, 5). If abduction has a logical form that is distinct from 
deduction and induction, it is because when working computationally – and thus 
involving a synthesis of both a new calculus and logic – the selective or creative 
activities of this retro-active thinking (i.e. that starts from consequences to track 
causes) involves a hypothesis generation and not simply an explanation of 
consequences.  
For instance, the automation of abduction includes AI computer programs such as 
ARCHIMEDES, which represents geometrical diagrams in pixels arrays and 
propositional statements Here, the computer program can manipulate and modify 
these representations and make new geometrical constructions, e.g., adding parts, 
moving elements and components (Magnani, 159). As the program manipulates 
specific diagrams, it also records new information and detects equivalences between 
areas so as to connect many different methods for learning and generalizing the 
Pythagorean theorem, by running experiments and observe the interaction between 
diagrams. This logical manipulation proposed by the program to verify the Theorem, 
involves the algorithmic autonomous discovery of conjunctures that contribute to the 
construction of demonstrations, but that also indicates the role of creativity in 
diagrammatic reasoning (160).  
Instead of statistical calculus based on the inductive inference to a general, already 
known rule, concept and object, that explain certain data, the goal of abduction is thus 
“to infer extentional knowledge” (Kakas and Sadri, 2002, 405).21 Whilst inductive 
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inferences is linked to statistical observations conforming to general rules and local 
situations, abduction instead describes the causes of observation that concern an 
incomplete state, using a general theory to create new hypothesis and explain their 
incompleteness.  
The automation of abduction has also been specific used in logical systems aiming to 
solve the problem of scheduling and planning, of optical music recognition, 
information integration and software inconsistencies (Kakas, 2000). In particular, the 
notion of Abductive Concept Learning has been used to discuss algorithms that 
integrate “explanatory learning” (predictive) and “learning with confirming” 
(descriptive), using both methods of inductive and abductive inferences in machine 
learning. But what exactly would an abductive form of learning in AI imply? One 
prerogative of this kind of automated abduction is that algorithms learn from 
incomplete information (thus involving the activity of prediction) and are able to 
classify new cases that may otherwise remain incomplete or not fully specified. Here 
the condition of the incompleteness of models is a motor for speculative algorithms 
that seek to learn from an incomplete background of data, whose predicates can be 
both specified and unspecified (Kakas, 3).  
In the specific context of machine learning, abductive reasoning is used to elaborate 
hypothesis in the face of incomplete information and overcome the problem of 
overfitting, whereby algorithms are heuristically programmed to learning from past 
data and thus delimit the configuration of larger and new hypothesis to given patterns 
of trial and error (3-4). As opposed to other machine learning systems that deal with 
incomplete information, such as for instance LINUS, the automated model of 
Abductive Concept Learning, for instance, does not simply adopt methods to 
complete the missing information and then learn from already completed data (4-5). 
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This model instead engages incomplete information dynamically and thus from within 
the very process of learning, where abduction works not only to track data retro-
actively, but also speculatively, by inventing hypothesis that can lead to new rules, 
axioms, truths.  
The so-called “non-monotonic” (i.e., ampliative) quality of expansive reasoning in 
abductive logic allows for more hypotheses to be constructed from locally-constrained 
inferential practices. It tends towards a general explanation, involving a synthetic 
dimension that integrates particularities through the speculative elaboration of axioms 
(and thus an expansion of deductive implications).  
Whilst automated abduction allows algorithms to learn from incomplete information, 
there are also programs such as SOLAR (Inoue et al., 2013, 246) using meta-level 
abduction, which is performed more generally on networks whose pathways are 
incomplete, and where links and nodes are missing. Deduction, the classic inferential 
model of meta-reasoning, aims to predict or track missing pathways through the laws 
of logical implications. Meta-level abduction instead is a “method to discover 
unknown relations from incomplete networks” (Inoue et al., 2013, 240) and involves 
“predicate invention in the form of quantified hypothesis” to infer missing rules, 
missing facts and unknown causes (240). In other words, this meta-theoretical 
dimension of inferential reasoning involves abductive learning from the observation 
of fact or data searching/finding, but also, and importantly here, from a goal “that has 
not been observed yet” (241).22 This learning through hypothetical processing may 
coincide with the speculative and transcendental elaboration of algorithmic retro-
duction, whereby consequences (or results) are not only tracked back to their causes 
(by means explanation), but are importantly also hypothesized beyond the observable 
as meta-abduction concern the consequences of the relations between particulars.   
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As automated cognition has entered the realm of hypothesis-making by connecting 
explanations between objects, objects and concepts, and concepts themselves, it has 
also re-opened the question of what it means for artificial intelligence to become 
general. This generality coincides not with a universal symbolic language or the 
efficient functionality of increasingly fast data correlations. Instead, general artificial 
intelligence involves a new sociality of logic, the hypothetical use-meaning of data, 
whose laws and rules are abstracted and re-engineered in the space of reason of 
machine cognition.  
Coda on general artificial intelligence. 
We can now conclude that the understanding of algorithmic automation in terms of 
what Hayles has called nonconscious cognition may perhaps not meet this 
pragmaticist view of general reasoning. I have suggested that the intelligible functions 
of the yet rudimentary forms of conceptual mediations occurring amongst algorithmic 
species and between algorithms, data, software programs, interfaces, hardware 
circuits point to a speculative reinventions with computation.  
With Magnani, it is possible to argue for the development of a theory of computation 
based on abductive manipulation, the tendency of a distributed artificial intelligence 
to think through automated doing. In other words, theoretical and manipulative 
abductions in automated systems show an experimental gap between causal efficacy 
and conceptual elaborations, demarcating a techno-sociality of thinking where the 
algorithmic use-meaning of data has become the dominant externality of cognition. In 
this model of abductive reasoning, it is possible to discern the conceptual 
infrastructure of social collective thinking from systems of automated intelligence, 
whose multiplication of intelligible functions implies a dynamic of calculus and logic.  
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From this standpoint, the technocapital subumption of thinking needs to be re-
addressed in terms of the automation of logic, exposing both the limits of deductive 
reasoning and the emergence of a critical function of computation – preserving errors 
and inventing truths by hypothesis. This means that debates about cognitive capital 
have risked confusing the crisis of rule-bounded logic with the end of reasoning and 
have thus overlooks the possibility of re-theorising automation in terms abductive 
inference and thus of claiming that logic in embedded in a social that includes 
machines. A recuperation of Peirce’s triadic system of abduction-induction-deduction 
shows us that logical thinking rather involves another level of reflexivity: the capacity 
of thinking about thinking, whereby logic involves a multifuctional elaboration of 
hypothesis able to infer a generality of meaning from discursive and non-discursive 
social practices.  
Thinking about thinking involves a further level of elaboration of intelligible 
functions, a meta-abduction established not by a 2nd order reflection of thinking 
through doing, but by the emergence of a 3rd level of abstraction, what I called, the 
automation of automation. 
From Magnani’s argument and the wider use of abduction in computation is thus 
evident that automated cognition even when operating by means of hypothetical 
inference cannot yet account for some key functions of reasoning, namely the know-
how skills – to say it with Wilfrid Sellars (1963, 324-6) - or the capacity to know the 
rules by which its patterning functions, without having to break them down into a set 
of instructions. From this standpoint, the method of experimental axiomatics 
developed through the scientific articulation of the incomputables is one instance of 
abductive logic insofar as it points to a rudimentary level of making incomputable 
data partially intelligible. However, as the determination of this randomness is 
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demarcating the tendency of AI to develop beyond its rudimentary intelligible 
capacities, it also points to a new form of generalised socialisation of rules, abstracted 
from the particularity of data contexts and yet exceeding models of encoded 
cognition.23 The question of automated cognition today concerns not only the capture 
of the social (and collective) qualities of thinking, but points to a general re-
structuring of reasoning as a new sociality of thinking. Automated decision-making 
are conceptual inferences, where rules and laws are invented and experimentally 
structured from the computational practices of data learning.   
This article has taken inspiration from Hayles’s fictive analysis of computational 
intelligences about what and how is thinking becoming in the scientific and 
technological articulation of cognition. For Hayles, cognition is a dynamic or 
processual doing and not simply a contemplative form of knowing. Her work has 
importantly individuated the extent to which machines have co-constituted non-
conscious functions of thinking and how they have internally questioned the idealism 
of axiomatic truth and disembodied reason. In particular, for Hayles non-conscious 
cognition is a central activity of artificial intelligences governing automated systems 
today.  
This article has addressed this view and argued that the crisis of deductive logic in 
artificial intelligence points to the emergence of an experimental axiomatics or 
speculative computation that forces us to re-articulate automated cognition. However, 
if the Scientific Image of computational logic has changed, it has also been able to 
question the Manifest Image of automated reasoning, which can no longer be 
explained in terms of an efficient execution of pre-established rules. Instead, the 
internal limits of algorithmic programing have marked the starting point for the fictive 
re-articulation of the Scientific and Manifest Image of how thinking works. If for 
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Hayles’ non-conscious cognition overlaps with a form of cybernetic control based on 
inductive learning, this article questions the technocapitalist subsumption of machine 
thinking and the dominance of the data-driven order. Abductive reasoning offers one 
possible envisioning of a general artificial intelligence that works speculatively at 
various scales (human and machine) and not as a unified Scientific Image of 
cognition. Critical computation thus opens up the possibility to account for a sociality 
of reasoning within the computational strata, lurking beneath the seamless 
acceleration of irrational decision-making. 
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1 Learning Algorithms are an evolution of genetic algorithms invented by Holland in the 1980s aiming 
to transform data into knowledge. Algorithms are series of instructions telling a computer what to do. If 
the simplest of algorithms is to combine two bits and can be reduced to the And, Or, and Not 
operations, in more complex systems, we have algorithms that combine with other algorithms, forming 
an ecosystem. Generally speaking, every algorithm has an input and an output, as data goes in the 
machine, the algorithms execute the instructions and leads to the pre-programmed result of the 
computation. Instead, with machine learning, data and and the preprogrammed result enter the 
computation, whilst the algorithm turns data into the result. In particular, learning algorithms make 
other algorithms insofar as machines write their own programs. In other words, learning algorithms are 
part of the automation of programing itself: computers now write their own programs. 
2 In supervised learning, example inputs and their desired outputs are given so that the machine can 
learn a general rule able to map inputs to outputs. With unsupervised learning, algorithms are given no 
label and are generally used to discover hidden patterns in data or learning. Reinforcement learning 
instead involves algorithms that perform a certain task in a dynamic environment without being told 
exactly how to behave. 
3 See Katherine Hayles, Cognition Everywhere: The Rise of the Cognitive Nonconscious and the Costs 
of Consciousness”. New Literary History 45(2), 2014. 
4 Hayles does not fully explain the specificities of conscious thinking. In this article, I consider the 
question of conscious and nonconscious thinking as both involving a prehensive mechanism of 
registering and evaluation data. I draw on Alfred N. Whitehead ‘s conception of prehension, which 
includes a distinction between physical and conceptual abilities of recording, evaluating and selecting 
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information. I draw on this important distinction to argue that algorithmic thinking involves sensible 
and intelligible modes of processing information, which include both non-conscious and conscious 
cognitive abilities. Instead, as I suggest later, algorithmic cognition is yet to acquire the function of 
reason insofar as incomputable layers of complexity cannot be fully integrated or compressed in 
algorithmic states. See Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: 
Free Press), 1978, pp. 23 – 26. 
5 Hayles makes reference to Stanisław Lem’s Summa Technologiae to explain that non-conscious 
cognition involves no calculation and that complex problem can be more efficiently resolved without 
the hierarchies of reflexivity and consciousness (Hayles, 2014). 
6 I draw on Alfred N. Whitehead’s discussion about the function of reason, which is constituted by at 
least three levels of data elaboration. The physical and conceptual levels of prehension that are 
common to all species at various degrees- moving from lower to higher degrees of selection, evaluation 
and decision. In addition to these levels, Whitehead points to the crucial function of reason in 
constituting a further level of abstraction, which he defines in terms of an abstract schema, involving 
the construction of a structure or system of relata (relations of relations or meta-relations). See Alfred 
N. Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Princeton University Press, 1929).   
7 It is interesting here to refer to Hayles’ explanation of this distinction in her discussion of Metzinger’s 
epiphenomenal view of the self, William James’s idea of the self as a construct, Damasio’s purposeful 
consciousness etc. Her point is that consciousness comes at the cost of constant confabulations that 
could not operate without the non-conscious cognition. For Hayles, this more general level of non-
conscious cognition across many forms of cognitive agents, including animals, humans and machines 
(2014).  
8 In How We Think, Hayles argues that coding technologies have transformed reading and writing and 
fundamentally enabled perception and cognition to develop analytic skills that move through larger 
quantities of information. Her argument that Humanities are faced with the power of digital technology 
also points at how the relation with the scientific method of analysis can be productive for close 
reading of texts. Her effort to re-visit the relation between thinking as the fundamental grounding of the 
scope of the Humanities (i.e., of moving beyond mere analysis) is further complemented by her work 
about non-conscious cognition and her explanation that computation and in particular algorithmic 
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procedural thinking involves non-reflexive activities and ultimately side-skips any logical requirement 
(Hayles 2012; 2014).  
9 According to American pragmatist Wilfrid Sellars, in order to articulate the relation between objects 
and thought beyond the assumption that the real world is directly given to us, we need to distinguish 
between the manifest image of man and the scientific image of man. Despite the gender-specific 
reference to human being, or persons, Sellars’ argument offers us a way to address the natural 
dimension of things and thoughts that can be explained scientifically or through a rigorous scientific 
method able to revise previous scientific truths in relation to the conceptual framework by which 
humans see themselves as part of the world. The Manifest Image indeed corresponds to a rudimentary 
but already conceptual framework, starting with a picturing of the condition of being human in the 
world. The Manifest Image thus account for the particularity of homo sapiens to be able to experience, 
to think and rationally act in the world of thinking of manifest appearances. Both these images are 
complex and global and do not constitute parts that sum up to a whole. Instead they are general images 
that give a naturalistic account of thinking of things and thinking of thoughts, whereby scientific 
epistemology coincides with an enterprise in knowing nature and yet such knowledge is the 
conditioning frame for the manifestation of thinking to occur and for the two images to fuse without 
merging into one another. In other words, the two images belong to the same order of complexity, 
defining a continuity of becoming between the images or a processual discontinuity that opens up the 
relation between nature and culture to scales of elaborations and continuous critical reflection about the 
objects described, understood, and represented. From this standpoint, this article is an attempt at 
analyzing the scientific image of computation (and thus its epistemological description in information 
and computational theory) and the manifest image of computation (the tendency of algorithmic 
processing of information to develop hypothetical thinking and abstract information form the social use 
of data). See Sellars W. ‘Science, Perception and Reality’. Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1963, pp. 
10-11. See also O’Shea, J.R. Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a Normative Turn. Polity, 2007. See also 
Seibt J. “How To Naturalize Sensory Consciousness and Intentionality Within A Process Monism with 
Normativity Gradient: A Reading of Sellars” J. O’Shea(ed.) Sellars and His Legacy. Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 
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10 See for instance, Pedro Domingo (2015) The Master Algorithm. How the Quest for the Ultimate 
Learning Machine Will Remake our World. NY, Penguin Random House, 2015; Carl Steiner, Automate 
This: How Algorithms Came to Rule Our World, NY: Penguin, 2012. 
11 I am referring here to research projects and computational applications emerged from the Affective 
Computing Group at MIT, which has devised computational skills in robotics and artificial intelligence 
that arise from, respond to, or influence emotions and other affective states. Amongst their research 
objectives are for instance, the design of modes of communicating affective-cognitive states, creating 
techniques that affect stress and frustrations, devising computational skills of emotional intelligence, 
developing personal technologies for self-awareness. See http://affect.media.mit.edu/ (last accessed 
November 23rd, 2016. See Picard Rosalind W. Affective Computing, MIT, 2000.  
12 With the term digital philosophy, I am referring to mathematicians and theoretical physicists using 
the computational paradigm to describe physical and biological phenomena in nature and to develop a 
computational description of the mind. This approach problematically merges being and thought 
through computation and thus gives an algorithmic explanation to both biophysical reality and the 
thinking of reality. One of the most problematic assumptions in this paradigm is the view that 
algorithms that evolve over time (i.e. cellular automata) can compress, render or simulate the various 
levels of physical, biological and cultural randomness or contingencies. See Stephen Wolfram, How 
Do Simple Programs Behave? Architectural Design 76, (4): 34 – 37, 2002.  
13 Hayles makes a reference to the experiment reported by Brian Massumi about the missing half 
second and other empirical evidence of affective states discussed by Antonio Damasio (2015).  
14 I am referring specifically to the theorization of control and affective biopolitcs that can be found in 
the work of Massumi (2015). I have written about the relation between the ecological power and the 
end of rationality and instead the re-articulaiton of logic for political ends in the article “Computational 
Logic and Ecological Rationality”, in On General Ecology. The New Ecological Paradigm in the 
Neocybernetic Age, Erich Horl with James Burton, London, Bloomsbury (forthcoming, 2017). 
15 In the movie Terminator, Skynet AI is an artificial general intelligence that acquires self-awareness 
and spreads across all computers serves, mobile devices, military satellites, androids and robots with 
the aim of safeguarding the world by conforming to its original program code (thus implementing 
deductive reasoning). Instead, the Skynet AI I am referring to here, would rather be open to the 
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contingencies and the data retrieved in the informational environment, which means that the original 
mandate of the code can evolve in unexpected directions.  
16 If Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of immanent axiomatics involve that rules have been replaced with 
the material performativity of behaviours, experimental axiomatics instead refers to how rules – and 
logic – are experimental compressions of randomness. 
17 As opposed to cognitive theories of computation, according to which to compute is to cognise and 
thus to produce a mental map of the data gathered by the senses, and to computational theories of 
cognition, for which to think is a binary affair determined by pre-set sequences of logical steps, I draw 
on Whitehead ‘s notion of prehension. For Whitehead, prehensions are modes of registering data 
involving a sensual or physical and conceptual or non-sensuous mode of recording the external world 
or the impact of externalities defining the capacities of reception of an actual entity. See Alfred N. 
Whitehead, Process and Reality, 23.  
18 I understand the relation between critical and speculative computation in terms of a dynamic tension 
between reflection and anticipation, the conceptual tracking of causality and the tendency to structure 
unknown information. This also involves the tension between the critical act of thinking causality or 
local states and the capacities of thinking to become an abstract or general function able to transcend 
specificities. This means that whilst Whitehead recognises that all thinking emerges form the 
biopshysical constraints of the living, he also argues that the function of reason is to elucidate and 
evaluate the causes through which these can be transcended. The function of reason is not determined 
by the direct apprehension of experience, but is rather a function of abstraction of the particular entities 
involved, and crucially involves the elaboration of the general conditions of the observations that are 
expressible without having to make reference to particular relations. For Whitehead, the rational 
attainment of this condition of generality ensures that these hold for an indefinite variety of other 
occasions. Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 24-25. 
19 Magnani clarifies that this model of abduction involves sentential, model-based and manipulative 
abduction, which not only describe the practice of abductive reasoning but also can be used to enhance 
the development of programmes that can computationally be able to re-discover or newly discover 
scientific hypothesis or mathematical theorems. See Lorenzo Magnani Abductive Cognition: The 
Epistemological and Eco-Cognitive Dimensions of Hypothetical Reasoning. Berlin Heidelberg: 
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Springer-Verlag, p.2. Magnani argues that abductive reason is irreducible to the deductive method of 
formal logics and this is demonstrated by the undecidability result of Turing’s ‘halting problem’, p. 69. 
20 Manipulative abduction also concerns particular kinds of heuristics that resort to the existence of 
extra-theoretical ways of thinking – thinking through doing. According to Magnani, many cognitive 
processes are centered on external representations that allow to create communicable accounts of new 
experiences ready to be integrated into previously existing systems of experimental and linguistic 
(theoretical) practices (2009). 
21  Extensional knowledge is here opposed to intentional knowledge. Whilst the former concerns 
inferences to a current situation, the latter rather implies universality across different states. See Marc 
Denecker and Antonio Kakas, (2002) “Abduction in Logic Programming” in Computational Logic: 
Logic Programming and Beyond. Kakas A and Sadri F ed. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin, 2002, 
406). 
22 For instance, meta-level abduction for goal finding is used in drug design and pharmacology where 
hypothesis are goal oriented and also for the improvement of physical techniques in musical 
performance in completed causal networks. See Katsumi Inoue et al. “Completing causal networks by 
meta- level abduction.” Machine Learning, Springer Verlag, 91 (2), 2013, pp. 241.  
23 My point is not to dismiss the possibility of automated thinking, but to theorise how the complex 
layers of algorithmic elaboration of data are able to condition and revise logical conclusions, can 
challenge both the ideas that automation is opposed to thinking but also that automation is the same as 
thinking. 
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